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UNHCR’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE GREAT
LAKES REFUGEE CRISIS
Kristen Wagner*
INTRODUCTION
The international community was completely unprepared
for the Great Lakes refugee crisis that occurred in Zaire follow-
ing one of the most atrocious genocides in global history: the
Rwanda genocide.  The international community was not pre-
pared to deal with the people who had committed the serious
crimes involved and who had caused others to flee.  Nor was the
international community prepared “to assist in providing effec-
tive security in the countries to which the refugees fled.”1  As a
result, the international community was faced with the almost
impossible task of putting an end to the widespread violence
and exploitation that festered within the refugee camps of the
region.2
During the Rwanda genocide, Hutu-led forces and the In-
terahamwe civilian militia killed approximately 800,000 Tutsi
and moderate Hutu.  Very few people fled the country during
the worst parts of the genocide.3  Rather, people fled the coun-
try when the new Tutsi-led government took control of the
country once the genocide was over.4  When the genocide ended
in July of 1994, there was a mass exodus of Rwandan refugees
* Managing Editor, PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW. J.D. Pace University
School of Law, 2009.  B.A. Smith College, 2006.  This article would not have been
possible without the support of my family and the international law faculty at Pace
University School of Law.  I also extend deep gratitude to the 2008-2009 members
of the PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW for their tremendous efforts in publishing
this issue.
1 The Role of the Military in Refugee Camp Security – Some Reflections
From a Human Rights Perspective (July 10-12, 2001), available at www.human
rightsfirst.org/intl_refugees/issues/security/speech_071001.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Todd Howland, Refoulement of Rwandan Refugees: The UNHCR’s Lost Op-
portunity to Ground Temporary Refuge in Human Rights Law, 4 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 73, 75 (1998).
4 Id. at 76.
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over the borders of Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire.5  The refugee
population consisted of both Hutu and Tutsi, but most of the
refugees were Hutu who fled Rwanda for fear of reprisal attacks
from the new Tutsi-led government.
The refugee camps in the Great Lakes region of Zaire be-
came home to over one million Rwandan refugees.  The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the
help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), set up the
camps.  However, it has been said that the UNHCR was “[t]he
single largest influence in these camps.”6  This paper addresses
the problems faced by the refugee camps in the Great Lakes
region of Zaire and how the UNHCR handled, or did not handle,
these problems.  Part I of this paper provides background infor-
mation on the circumstances under which the camps were
formed and what problems arose within the camps.  Part II dis-
cusses the UNHCR’s legal mandate with regard to refugee pro-
tection, and Part III discusses this legal mandate specifically in
terms of applying exclusion clauses and performing refugee sta-
tus determination (RSD) in the camps of Zaire.  Part IV then
makes suggestions as to how the UNHCR could have done
things differently and what the UNHCR should do to improve
its response to similar situations in the future.
The analysis of the UNHCR’s legal mandate and its in-
volvement in the Great Lakes refugee crisis is a pertinent mat-
ter as more and more conflicts, such as civil war and genocide,
continue to occur in countries around the world, specifically in
Africa.  With such situations continuously occurring, and the in-
creasing involvement of the UNHCR, it is necessary to figure
out where the UNHCR went wrong in the Great Lakes region
and how its legal mandate can be corrected in order to provide
the necessary guidance in similar situations that are sure to
come in the future.
I. GREAT LAKES REGION REFUGEE CAMPS
From the very beginning of the crisis, the refugee camps of
the Great Lakes region were doomed due to the unique nature
5 Dorinda Lea Peacock, Comment, “It Happened and It Can Happen Again”:
The International Response to Genocide in Rwanda, 22 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
899, 918-19 (1997).
6 Howland, supra note 3, at 79.
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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of the mass exodus of Rwandans over the Zaire border.  The na-
ture of the refugee population itself was the largest cause of the
problems suffered within the camps.  The conditions within the
camps proved to be poor in various aspects, and worsened dra-
matically over the course of the two years they were main-
tained.  The UNHCR was there through it all.  The High
Commissioner, when speaking to the United Nations Security
Council, described the refugee camps of the Great Lakes region
as “a quandary of humanitarian, political and security chal-
lenges” and stated his belief that “a humanitarian disaster may
be imminent.”7  What caused the disastrous conditions of the
refugee camps essentially came down to the simple fact that the
people who fled Rwanda were more likely to be perpetrators of
the genocide, rather than the victims of the genocide.8
On July 13, 1994 about 100,000 Rwandan refugees crossed
the Zaire border into Goma where they were met by hundreds of
humanitarian workers.9  Camps were quickly constructed just
kilometers over the border and four days later the refugee popu-
lation rose to over one million.10  Katale was the largest camp,
while the Bukavu region had over 300,000 refugees in 27
camps, and Uvira had 180,000 refugees in 12 camps.11 Officials
called this “the greatest refugee flood in modern times.”12 On
July 19, 1994, cholera broke out in the camps, followed by other
various diseases.  These outbreaks caused 50,000 people to die,
most of whom were women and children.13  To correct the prob-
lem of disease, the UNHCR sought additional supplies and sug-
gested that camps be set up further north in Zaire.  However,
7 Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Remarks
to the Security Council (Oct. 25, 1996), available at http://www.unhcr.org/admin/
ADMIN/3ae68fbec.html.
8 Howland, supra note 3, at 75.
9 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic
of Legal Mandates, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 583, 592 (2006).
10 Dennis McNamara, Assistant High Commissioner for Protection and Direc-
tor of the Division of International Protection Services, Statement to the House
Committee on International Relations, Sub-Committee on International Opera-
tions and Human Rights – Hearing on “Rwanda: Genocide and the Continuing Cy-
cle of Violence” (May 5, 1998), available at http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/42
b81cd22.html.
11 Cuellar, supra note 9, at 592-93.
12 Id. at 588.
13 McNamara, supra note 10.
3
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 190 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 190 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR111.txt unknown Seq: 4 26-MAR-09 13:52
368 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:365
the Zairian government refused such requests and did not allow
for consideration of sites further from the border.14
Besides disease, inadequate supplies, and the less than
favorable locations of the camps, the largest problem faced by
the UNHCR in the camps was the fact that mixed in with the
civilian Hutu refugee population were many perpetrators of the
genocide.15  As the Secretary General stated, “[c]onflict often
leads to mixed movements of populations, comprising not only
refugees, internally displaced persons and other civilians, but
also armed elements seeking sanctuary in neighbouring coun-
tries.”16 This particular refugee population consisted of former
government soldiers and militia who were somehow able to re-
group and pose military and political threats within the
camps.17  As a result, the refugees in the camps found them-
selves under virtually complete control of the former Hutu gov-
ernment and its allies “who had just perpetrated the fastest
mass genocide in history.”18
The exiled Hutu leaders controlled food and supply distri-
bution within the camps by rewarding their allies and punish-
ing their enemies.19  In an October 21, 1994 press release, the
UNHCR stated, “[i]n some camps, the former authorities ha[d]
virtually taken control of all food and relief distribution in order
to consolidate their power and to manipulate and dominate the
camp population.”20  The former militia essentially held the ref-
ugee population hostage in the camps, getting humanitarian as-
sistance, selling it on the black market, and buying arms to re-
attack Rwanda.21
Civilian Hutu refugees were forced by the Hutu militia and
former government members to remain in the refugee camps.
14 Id.
15 Peacock, supra note 5, at 919.
16 UNHCR Jakarta, Expert Meeting on Maintaining the Civilian and Human-
itarian Character of Asylum, Background Paper: Under What Circumstances Can
a Person Who Has Taken an Active Part in the Hostilities of an International or a
Non-International Armed Conflict Become an Asylum Seeker?, at 38, UNHCR Doc.
PPLA/2004/01 (June 2004) (prepared by Ste´phane Jaquemet).
17 Peacock, supra note 5, at 919.
18 Cuellar, supra note 9, at 593.
19 Id. at 595-96.
20 Ogata, supra note 7.
21 Metta Spencer, A Doctor Without Borders: James Orbinski, PEACE MAGA-
ZINE, April 1997, at 20.
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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This was done in an attempt by the former militia and govern-
ment to continue their campaign against the Rwandan Tutsi
population from within the camps in Zaire.22 The former mili-
tiamen and government members masqueraded as legitimate
refugees and “exploited the chaotic conditions of the camps.”
They used threats against the civilian population to keep them
from leaving the camps and returning to Rwanda.23  Many of
the refugees said that they would have returned to Rwanda
much sooner if “they had not been forced to stay by the Hutu
militia that had controlled the camps by terror tactics since
1994.”24
The former leaders kept the refugees from returning to
Rwanda through physical intimidation and the consistent use of
propaganda that convinced many of the Hutu refugees that they
would face deadly retribution if they were to return to
Rwanda.25  When the refugees were questioned about going
home, men would surround them, sometimes with machetes in
hand, in successful attempts to control their comments.26  The
former Hutu military and the civilian militia had no incentive
to go back to Rwanda and they were trying to prevent the civil-
ian refugees from returning.  This left the refugees “at the
center of a deadly propaganda war between the new Tutsi gov-
ernment and the old Hutu one, the latter of which offer[ed] a
nightmarish choice between staying and risking death from dis-
ease, or leaving and risking being killed.”27
An additional problem that the camps and the UNHCR
faced was the lack of power and authority of the local Zairian
authorities.28  This, along with the intimidation tactics of the
perpetrators of the genocide, led to a general atmosphere of vio-
lence, corruption, destruction and chaos within the camps.29
While the government of Zaire was required to help maintain
the camps and enforce security measures, as the High Commis-
22 Peacock, supra note 5, at 900.
23 Id. at 919-20.
24 Id. at 920.
25 Michael Hill, Hutu Refugee Flood Into Rwanda Grow; UN Aid Official
Claims Magnitude Overwhelming, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 17, 1996, at 18A.
26 Liz Sly, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1994, at 1.
27 Id.
28 McNamara, supra note 10.
29 Cuellar, supra note 9, at 601.
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sioner stated, “[t]he local security forces were poorly led and un-
paid, which conspired to create an atmosphere of corruption,
extortion and anarchy.”30  Eventually, an elite force of the presi-
dential guard replaced the local Zairian authorities.31  This
force was financed by the UNHCR and trained by an interna-
tional police force.32
II. UNHCR’S LEGAL MANDATE
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was
established on January 1, 1951 pursuant to a decision of the
General Assembly and the adoption of the Statute of the Office
on December 14, 1950.33  The UNHCR’s Statute is the legal ba-
sis for the organ’s responsibilities.34  The 1951 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) and its
subsequent 1967 Protocol govern refugee status within the
framework of the United Nations.35  The 1967 Protocol simply
gave the 1951 Convention a more “universal scope by removing
the geographical and temporal limitations related to the defini-
tion of refugee.”36  These two legal mandates give the UNHCR
the role of protecting refugees and finding solutions to their
problems.37
The UNHCR’s primary responsibility is to provide protec-
tion and assistance to refugees.38  This is to be done through the
making of special agreements between the UNHCR and govern-
ments to execute any necessary measures to improve refugees’
situations and to reduce the number of refugees requiring pro-
tection.39  Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol,
30 Ogata, supra note 20.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 United Nations High Commission for Refugees Handbook on Procedures
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees at ¶ 14 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter
Handbook]. See G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/ 428 (Dec. 14, 1950).
34 Corinne Lewis, UNHCR’s Contribution to the Development of International
Refugee Law: Its Foundations and Evolution, 17 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 67, 70 (2005).
See U.N. Doc. A/RES/428 (Dec. 1950).
35 Handbook, supra note 33, at ¶ 1.
36 Lewis, supra note 34, at 76.
37 Cuellar, supra note 29, at 609.
38 McNamara, supra note 10.
39 Lewis, supra note 34, at 70.
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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the High Commissioner also has the responsibility of maintain-
ing the process of refugee status determination (RSD).40
The 1951 Convention was created in a post-World War II
climate and, therefore, only applied to a narrow class of refu-
gees.  At the time of its creation, the 1951 Convention only ap-
plied to people who were displaced within Europe “on account of
race, religion, political opinion, or nationality before 1950.”41
However, the UNHCR and its legal mandate have come to be
designated, legally, as “the primary refugee advocate under in-
ternational law” overseeing the organization of refugee camps,
funding services for refugees, monitoring camp conditions and
negotiating with host countries.42  The High Commissioner is
also supposed to work with NGOs to respond to the needs of
refugees.43
In addition to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol,
there are various regional agreements concerning refugee sta-
tus44 that the UNHCR must work with as well.  In terms of the
refugee crisis in the Great Lakes region, the 1951 Convention,
the 1967 Protocol, and the 1969 Organization for African Unity
Refugee Convention (OAU Convention) together form the rele-
vant treaty obligations as all states in the Great Lakes region
have ratified the OAU Convention and are party to the 1951
Convention.45
The OAU Convention extended the refugee definition of the
1951 Convention to include “those compelled to leave their
country not only as a result of persecution, but also owing to
conflict or ‘events seriously disturbing the public order’ in either
part of the whole of their country.”46  The OAU Convention also
identifies categories of people who are to be excluded from refu-
gee status, just as the 1951 Convention does, in order to “make
a distinction between a refugee who seeks a peaceful and nor-
mal life and a person fleeing his country for the sole purpose of
fomenting subversion from outside.”47  These additions were
40 Handbook, supra note 33, at ¶ 19.
41 Cuellar, supra note 9, at 655.
42 Id. at 653.
43 Id. at 609.
44 Handbook, supra note 33, at ¶ 20.
45 McNamara, supra note 10.
46 Id.
47 Id.
7
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made in order to keep people from escaping justice by claiming
refugee status.48
The UNHCR has also published specific guidelines to com-
plement the 1951 Convention and the UNHCR Handbook.49
The UNHCR’s guidelines on the application of the exclusion
clauses are particularly relevant to the discussion at hand.50
These particular guidelines summarize the UNHCR’s “Back-
ground Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses”51 and
are meant to “provide interpretive legal guidance for govern-
ments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, as
well as UNHCR staff carrying out refugee status determination
in the field.”52  Exclusion and refugee status determination, as
will be discussed later in this paper, are the two major areas in
which the UNHCR could have improved its involvement in the
Great Lakes refugee crisis following the Rwanda genocide.
III. UNHCR’S LEGAL MANDATE AND THE GREAT LAKES
REFUGEE CRISIS
Exclusion
Paragraph 7(d) of the 1950 UNHCR Statute, Article 1F of
the 1951 Convention and Article I(5) of the OAU Convention all
require States and the UNHCR to deny refugee status and its
benefits to people who would not otherwise qualify as refu-
gees.53  These provisions are all exclusion clauses.  The ratio-
nale behind the exclusion clauses is that “certain acts are so
grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of interna-
tional protection as refugees. . .and to ensure that such persons
do not abuse the institution of asylum in order to avoid being
held legally accountable for their acts.”54  Another reason for
the exclusion clauses is to protect the community of the host
state from dangers associated with admitting refugees who
48 Id.
49 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, Application of the Exclu-
sion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,
15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 492, 492 (2003) [hereinafter Guidelines]. See also Lewis,
supra note 34, at 81.
50 See Guidelines, supra note 49.
51 Id. at 492.
52 Id. at 492.
53 Id. at 493.
54 Id. at 493.
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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have committed serious crimes.55  Article 1F is the exclusion
clause that most directly applies to the refugees that caused the
problems in the Great Lakes regions.56
Article 1F states that the provisions of the 1951 Convention
will not apply to people who have: (a) “committed a crime
against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity;” (b)
“committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;” or (c)
“been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.”57  Articles 1F(a) and 1F(c) are concerned
with crimes whenever and wherever they are committed.  By
contrast, the scope of Article 1F(b) is expressly limited to crimes
committed outside the host country prior to admission into the
state as a refugee.58  Article 1F(a) is the broadest category fall-
ing under the exclusion clause.59  Under Article 1F(a) crimes
against humanity include acts such as genocide, murder, rape
and torture.60  The distinguishing feature under this section is
that these acts must be committed “as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against the civilian population.”61
Additionally, asylum is not meant to be a vehicle by which
combatants prolong their armed struggles.  As stated before, in-
ternational criminals are not supposed to be using the refugee
protection system as a means to escape justice.  This is why the
1951 Convention provides means by which to exclude such
criminals from attaining refugee status.62  This goal was thus
never achieved in the Great Lakes region due to the UNHCR’s
failure to apply the exclusion clauses.  There is no doubt that
the former Hutu government members and militiamen fall into
this category of excluded refugees as they perpetrated a mass
genocide.  Yet, these people were allowed into the refugee
camps, thereby setting the stage for one of the most disastrous
refugee situations in history.
55 Handbook, supra note 33, at ¶ 151.
56 Id. at ¶ 140.
57 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
58 Guidelines, supra note 49, at 494.
59 Id. at 495.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Cuellar, supra note 9, at 615-16.
9
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Some may argue that due to the mass influx nature of the
Rwandan refugees’ flight into Zaire, application of the exclusion
clauses was not possible.  However, the UNHCR guidelines on
the application of the exclusion clauses specifically state, “[t]he
exclusion clauses can also apply in situations of mass influx, al-
though in practice the individual screening required may cause
operational and practical difficulties.”63  Until this screening
process is undertaken, all people are to receive protection and
assistance.64  Therefore, while the guidelines do recognize that
situations of mass influx will often result in difficulties with ap-
plying the exclusion clauses and that all refugees are entitled to
protection and assistance until that process is complete, they
nonetheless maintain that the exclusion clauses still do apply.
The guidelines also note that the screening process is sub-
ject “to the separation of armed elements from the civilian refu-
gee population.”65  Therefore, in a situation of mass influx, the
screening and identification process to facilitate the separation
of armed elements and civilians is overridden by the need for
assistance because of the emergent nature of such an arrival of
refugees.66  However, this need for assistance does not ulti-
mately negate the duty to separate armed elements and com-
plete the screening process.
While all of the refugees in the camps of the Great Lakes
region did need assistance, and were entitled to it while separa-
tion and screening took place, it should not have been assumed
that all of the refugees were legally deserving of and entitled to
such assistance,67 thereby relieving the UNHCR of its duty to
apply the exclusion clauses.  However, no efforts were ever
made to apply the exclusion clauses in determining who out of
the refugee population was legally deserving of the assistance.68
This failure could have been a result of the unique situations
that arise from a mass influx of refugees.  Because of the mass
influx nature of this particular refugee crisis, the UNHCR “did
not even have an accurate name and number count, let alone
sufficient information and control to begin to separate refuge-
63 Guidelines, supra note 49, at 500.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Jaquemet, supra note 16, at 3.
67 Howland, supra note 3, at 76.
68 Id. at 84.
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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seekers who were ineligible for assistance.  While different
mechanisms were considered, nothing large-scale was ever
implemented.69
Unfortunately, the exclusion clause guidelines were not in
place at the time.  If they had been, perhaps the UNHCR would
have made more efforts to isolate those who committed human
rights violations from the rest of the refugee population.70  But
because this legal obligation was never performed, other
problems arose within the camps.  The camps were used as a
sort of military base “to destabilize the Rwandan regime and to
finish the genocide.”71 Rather than imposing the exclusion
clauses of the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR subjected the refu-
gee population to group status determination.72  This was not
only a result of the UNHCR’s failure to follow its own legal
mandate, but it was also a result of the provision in the OAU
Convention that grants refugee status to people who flee their
countries “as a result of events seriously effecting public or-
der.”73  However, the OAU Convention provides the same bases
of exclusion as the 1951 Convention.  And much like the exclu-
sion clauses of the 1951 Convention, these exclusion clauses
were not implemented either, thereby allowing people who “un-
questionably instigated, or directly participated in, the genocide
and were thus subject to the exclusion clause” to seek refuge
within the camps of the Great Lakes region.74
Under both the 1951 Convention and the OAU Convention,
the competence to decide when the exclusion clauses apply rests
in the hands of the “State in whose territory the applicant seeks
recognition as a refugee.”75  However, under paragraph 8 of the
UNHCR Statute and Article 35 of the 1951 Convention, the
UNHCR has the responsibility to help the States with exclusion
69 Id.
70 Id. at 96.
71 Id. at 85.
72 UNHCR, Evaluation Report: Lessons Learned From the Rwanda and
Burundi Emergencies (Dec. 1, 1996), http://www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/3
ae6bcfc4.html [hereinafter Lessons].
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502,
507 (2003).
11
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determination and to supervise the practice.76  In response to
this particular crisis, the UNHCR recognized that it had failed
in this respect, and expressed that it was “deeply concerned”
with the “presence of suspected perpetrators . . . among the ref-
ugees.”  However, neither the UNHCR nor the host State was
able to exclude perpetrators of the genocide from refugee status
because of “serious security constraints.”77 The UNHCR
claimed that is was impossible to identify the refugees who fell
under the exclusion clause because of the dangers involved in
any attempts to go through the identification process.78
Refugee Status Determination
Refugee status determination (RSD) has been called “the
doorway to the protection and assistance that the international
community provides to refugees.”79  The RSD process has two
steps: (1) ascertaining the facts of the case; and (2) applying the
refugee definitions provided in the 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol to those facts.80  In many cases, the UNHCR acts as
the “gatekeeper” for this process by deciding who among the
asylum-seekers can be saved from deportation and detention,
who is entitled to receive humanitarian assistance and who can
apply to settle in third countries.81
There is nothing in the UNHCR’s legal mandate that re-
quires it to undergo the process of RSD.82  Normally, the
UNHCR does not undergo RSD in States that are party to the
1951 Convention.83  RSD is the responsibility of the host gov-
ernments under both the 1951 Convention and the OAU Con-
vention.84  The UNHCR’s role therefore is simply to offer advice
and support to the host governments in carrying out RSD proce-
dures.85  However, the UNHCR is required to protect and assist
76 Id. at 507-08.
77 Lessons, supra note 72.
78 Id.
79 Michael Kagan, The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection Challenges Posed
by UNHCR Refugee Status Determination, 18 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 2 (2005).
80 Handbook, supra note 33, at 9.
81 Kagan, supra note 79, at 2.
82 Id. at 24.
83 Background Note on the Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 75, at 508.
84 McNamara, supra note 10.
85 Id.
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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refugees, and in many cases, for this to happen, the UNHCR
must undertake RSD procedures when the host State cannot or
will not.86 Therefore, in exceptional cases where the host gov-
ernment is not fulfilling its duty with regard to RSD, the
“UNHCR may take the lead on behalf of states, under its man-
date and responsibility for recognition and exclusion of refu-
gees, if requested to do so.”87
The 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocol, and the OAU Conven-
tion all provide that host governments may institute RSD pro-
cedures.88  However, situations of mass influx pose problems for
RSD just as they do for application of the exclusion clauses.
The RSD provisions of the UNHCR’s legal mandate were not
designed for situations of mass influx.  Formal determination of
refugee status of individuals in such situations is generally not
considered to be necessary with a prima facie determination of
the status of the group generally declared.89  However, during
situations of mass influx, such as the case in the Great Lakes
region after the Rwanda genocide, individual determination of
refugee status is nearly impossible, yet still essential to success-
ful protection and assistance of refugees.  As such, the main pri-
ority for the UNHCR in the Great Lakes region was first to
“provide assistance and emergency protection measures so as to
preserve life.”90  This is exactly what happened in the camps;
however, status determination, which was meant to ensue
swiftly after initial emergency assistance and protection were
provided,91 never happened.
In cases where thousands of people simultaneously flee into
a country, the UNHCR may make group refugee status determi-
nations.92  However, group determinations can cause their own
problems “because they are necessarily somewhat ad hoc appli-
cations of a legal definition meant to apply to individuals.”93
Convincing states to protect people who are fleeing “necessitous
86 Kagan, supra note 79, at 24.
87 McNamara, supra note 10.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Geoff Gilbert, Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses,
UNHCR Note, 30 (2001).
91 Id.
92 Cuellar, supra note 29, at 610.
93 Id.
13
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circumstances” is a primary concern of the UNHCR.94  How-
ever, the UNHCR has recognized “that, in situations of mass
influx, blanket protection at a minimal level is preferable to
refoulement.”95  This was the UNHCR’s approach in the camps
of the Great Lakes region.  However, this approach proved to be
fatal, and made it clear that completing RSD is essential to ef-
fective refugee assistance and protection.
Many countries in Africa have not implemented the neces-
sary institutional and legal structures in order to sufficiently
respond to the needs of refugees.96  This lack of domestic legis-
lation allowing African host States the ability to fulfill their in-
ternational treaty obligations not only “ ‘creates uncertainty
about the status of refugees at the national and local level,’ but
also explains why the policy and practice of both governments
and humanitarian organizations are often inconsistent with in-
ternational human rights standards.”97  Adequate RSD proce-
dures are lacking in Africa primarily because the UNHCR staff
working on RSD often applies non-legal rules of convenience
and lack proper training in refugee law. “[T]hose who have
proper training are often compromised by the bureaucracies of
their organizations.”98
In the case of the Great Lakes refugee crisis, among the 1.2
million Rwandan refugees were people who could have demon-
strated that they were refugees according to the 1951 Conven-
tion, but were not given the opportunity to present their
cases.99  On the whole, most of the refugees only had a “subjec-
tive fear of returning, and did not have any individualized facts
to support their claim to refugee status.”100  The UNHCR de-
cided that in this situation of such chaos and misery individual
RSD procedures were impossible to carry out.101  This decision
was in accord with the UNHCR’s 1979 decision that in situa-
94 Joan Fitzpatrick, Flight From Asylum: Trends Toward Temporary “Refuge”
and Local Responses to Forced Migrations, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 13, 42 (1994).
95 Id.
96 Zachary A. Lomo, The Struggle for Protection of the Rights of Refugees and
IDPs in Africa: Making the Existing International Legal Regime Work, 18 BERKE-
LEY J. INT’L L. 268, 275 (2000).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 279.
99 Howland, supra note 3, at 82.
100 Id.
101 Fitzpatrick, supra note 94, at 56-57.
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tions of mass influx, those seeking asylum should always be
guaranteed temporary refuge at the very least.102  Therefore,
“refuge and international assistance was extended even to
likely militia members and the remnants of the Rwandan
army.”103
Efforts were made to identify separate sites that were suit-
able for the former militiamen, away from the rest of the refu-
gee population; however, this mission was never successful due
to the UNHCR’s inability to distinguish between the two popu-
lations.104  While some of the former combatants had entered
the camps clothed in their uniforms, many of them had dressed
themselves in civilian clothes, making it impossible for the
UNHCR to distinguish them from the rest of the refugee popu-
lation.105  Additionally, there were between ten and fifteen
thousand Interahamwe members within the camps who, unlike
the soldiers, never wore uniforms, making them indistinguish-
able from the very beginning.106
IV. SUGGESTIONS
Separation, RSD, and Exclusion
One of the biggest mistakes that the UNHCR made in set-
ting up the refugee camps in the Great Lakes region was al-
lowing the refugees to maintain their political and social
hierarchies within the camps.  There was a serious lack of un-
derstanding with regard to the social, cultural, and political
background of the Rwanda genocide on the part of the
UNHCR.107  If the UNHCR had been more familiar with these
aspects of the refugees’ lives, it would have been more able to
develop policies to deal with the “former militia members, army
contingents and government authorities many of whom may
have been subject to the exclusion clause due to their involve-
ment in the genocide.”108  However, when the camps were es-
102 Id. at 42.
103 Id. at 56-57.
104 UNHCR, Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region, Evaluation Re-
port, 10 (April 1997).
105 Id.
106 Id. at para. 38
107 Lessons, supra note 72.
108 Id.
15
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tablished, the UNHCR had not adequately researched the social
and political circumstances of the Rwanda genocide; therefore,
the staff was not prepared for these obstacles and did not put
the necessary procedural measures into place.
Generally speaking, people who had played a direct role in
the conflict and who had not yet laid down their arms should
have been disarmed and separated from genuine asylum seek-
ers, and then interned.109  This could have been achieved by the
establishment of specialized exclusion units within the institu-
tion responsible for RSD, and given the job of handling exclu-
sion cases in order to ensure that they were expeditiously dealt
with.110
Requiring refugees to register with the authorities within
the camps in order to obtain aid and verifying the registration
information with information regarding the refugees’ identities
would have resulted in the RSD process being performed and
the exclusion clauses being successfully implemented.111  Such
a practice would provide a mechanism by which the refugee
population could be separated into groups of people who were
and were not eligible for aid.112  The fact that most of the “mem-
bers of the non-governmental armed groups or local militias
mingle[d] with civilians and rarely [wore] military uniforms or
distinctive signs” made it even more difficult for the host State
and the UNHCR to assess these individuals’ asylum claims.113
In a situation of mass influx such as this, where a failure to
separate will undoubtedly lead to grave consequences, a re-
sponse in this regard is necessary under refugee law, interna-
tional humanitarian law, and the UN Charter.114
109 Ste´phane Jaquemet, Deputy Regional Representative, UNHCR Jakarta,
Under What Circumstances Can a Person Who Has Taken an Active Part in the
Hostilities of an International or a Non-International Armed Conflict Become an
Asylum Seeker?, at iv, UNHCR Doc. PPLA/2004/01 (June 2004).
110 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, Application of the Exclu-
sion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 492, 500 (2003).
111 Todd Howland, Refoulement of Rwandan Refugees: The UNHCR’s Lost Op-
portunity to Ground Temporary Refuge in Human Rights Law, 4 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 73, 96-97 (1998).
112 Id.
113 Jaquemet, supra note 16, at 18.
114 Id. at 19-21.
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The UNHCR failed its obligations in the refugee camps of
the Great Lakes region by not making early, formal assess-
ments of the refugee caseload.115  If these assessments had been
made, those deserving of refugee status would have been sepa-
rated from those who perpetrated the genocide, thereby bypas-
sing many of the problems that were soon to follow within the
camps.116  Additionally, the UNHCR should have assessed the
host State’s ability to maintain public order within the camps.
If this assessment had been made, the UNHCR would have
known better what kind of conditions it was dealing with and
could have staffed the camps and prepared accordingly.117
The separation of armed combatants and perpetrators of
genocide from the civilian refugee population “is critical to core
principles of refugee law, including: 1) the humanitarian and
non-political nature of asylum and refugee status; 2) the civilian
character of refugee camps and settlements; 3) the principle of
non-refoulement; and 4) asylum for all those who meet the refu-
gee criteria.”118  However, separation is not a single legal con-
cept; separation is comprised of “acts and processes and
outcomes” whose object is the identification and removal of cer-
tain members of the population from the general population of
refugees.119  The ultimate issue here is that there is nothing in
the UNHCR’s legal mandate providing means by which to
achieve this necessary goal.
Legal Mandate
It is easy to say what the UNHCR should have or could
have done, but the truth is that the UNHCR’s legal mandate is
not expansive enough to provide for such remedies.  While the
UNHCR operates under its statute, the 1951 Convention, the
1967 Protocol, the OAU Convention, and other regional agree-
ments, the only guidelines as to how the UNHCR is to actually
115 Lessons, supra note 72.
116 UNHCR, Evaluation Report, Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Re-
gion, 2-3, U.N. Doc. EVAL/01/97 (Apr. 1997) [hereinafter Refugee Camp Security].
117 Id.
118 Jaquemet, supra note 16, at 35.
119 Deirdre Clancy, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Protection of Refu-
gees in Mass Influx Situations, Statement on Behalf of NGOs, Global Consulta-
tions on International Protection (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/intl_refugees/issues/security/armed_elements.pdf.
17
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carry out these legal obligations are its Handbook and various
“Guidelines” that have been published.120  Beyond these docu-
ments, there is little to nothing that is actually guiding the
UNHCR in terms of how to carry out its legal mandate in the
various refugee situations that it comes across.
Specially trained personnel should staff refugee camps in
situations of mass influx.  Properly trained personnel would
have the specialized training to assess “the features of the local
situation [and] identify actual or potential security problems . . .
on the basis of the general guidelines in the handbook.”121  In
response to the mixed refugee population, in which genuine ref-
ugees are mingled with armed militiamen, that results from sit-
uations of mass influx, Security Council Resolutions 1208 and
1296 were passed to set out parameters for such a situation.122
These Security Council Resolutions stated the obvious conclu-
sions123 that certain results from having armed elements mixed
with the civilian refugee population within refugee camps are
less than favorable, but the Resolutions provide no concrete
guidelines to follow in order to avoid these negative, yet obvi-
ous, results.
120 See Handbook, supra note 33. See also Guidelines, supra note 49.
121 Refugee Camp Security, supra note 116, at 4-5.
122 Jaquemet, supra note 16, at 27.
123 Id.  Acts of violence directed against refugees have an impact on durable
peace, reconciliation and development (S.C. Res. 1296, pmbl. para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000)).  Situations where refugees are vulnerable to the threat
of harassment or where their camps are vulnerable to infiltration by armed ele-
ments may constitute a threat to international peace and security (S.C. Res. 1296,
¶ 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1296 (Apr. 19, 2000)).  The provision of security to refugees
and the maintenance of the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps
and settlements is an integral part of the national, regional and international re-
sponse to refugee situations and can contribute to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security (S.C.  Res. 1208, pmbl. para. 3 & ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1208 (Nov. 19, 1998).  It is unacceptable to use refugees and other person in refu-
gee camps and settlements to achieve military purposes in the country of asylum
or in the country of origin (S.C. Res. 1208, pmbl. para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1208
(Nov. 19, 1998)). Measures have to be taken by the host State, with the support of
the international community, if need be, to disarm armed elements and to then sep-
arate them from the refugee population and prevent them from getting engaged in
military activities (S.C. Res. 1208, ¶¶ 3, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1208 (Nov. 19, 1998))
(emphasis added).  Armed or military elements and persons who want to achieve
military purposes from the territory of the host country do not qualify for the inter-
national protection afforded refugees (S.C. Res. 1208, pmbl. para. 8, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1208 (Nov. 19, 1998)).
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
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Security Council Resolution 1208, adopted in 1998, recog-
nizes the need to maintain the “civilian and humanitarian char-
acter of refugee camps” and the “unacceptability of using
refugees and other persons in refugee camps . . . to achieve mili-
tary purposes in the country of asylum or in the country of ori-
gin.”124  The resolution then goes on to call for the UNHCR’s
support in the “separation of refugees from other persons who
do not qualify for international protection afforded refugees.”125
However, nowhere in the resolution does it state how this is to
be done.  This is a prime example of why the UNHCR’s legal
mandate is not expansive enough to properly handle such situa-
tions as the Great Lakes refugee crisis; the UNHCR is simply
not provided with the necessary, well-articulated guidelines
and procedures to carry out its legal obligations.
In response to the Great Lakes refugee crisis after the
Rwanda genocide, the separation of armed elements from refu-
gees became a primary issue to be discussed within the
UNHCR.126  This discussion resulted in the ExCom/Global Con-
sultations meeting that eventually produced the Executive
Committee Conclusion that reiterates the general principles of
Conclusion No. 48, thereby providing “more specific guidance as
to the manner in which the civilian character of refugee settle-
ments could be maintained.”127  Executive Committee Conclu-
sion No. 94 includes principles such as early identification,
separation, and internment of armed elements.128  Additionally,
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 22 concludes that in situa-
tions of mass influx, separation should not occur at the border
“so as to hinder the admission of those in the mass influx.”
Rather, the movement of the entire refugee population into the
host country should “be restricted for security reasons until
such time as armed elements can be identified and separated
from the civilian populations.”129  While these Conclusions set
out admirable goals, they do not provide the means by which to
achieve them.
124 S.C. Res. 1208, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1208 (November 19, 1998).
125 Id. at ¶ 4.
126 Jaquemet, supra note 16, at 38.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 42.
19
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For example, Executive Committee Conclusion No. 94
states, “[c]ombatants should not be considered as asylum-seek-
ers until the authorities have established . . . that they have
genuinely and permanently renounced military activities.”  It
then goes on to state, “once this has been established, special
procedures should be put in place for individual [RSD], to en-
sure that those seeking asylum fulfill the criteria” of refugee
status with “utmost attention paid to article 1F of the 1951 Con-
vention.”130  However, yet again, the conclusion does not pro-
vide any guidelines by which to “establish” these “special
procedures,” or what these procedures should consist of.
NGOs
NGOs have expressed their own concerns with mass refu-
gee migrations such as the Great Lakes Refugee crisis.  The
NGOs generally accept the notion that individual “states and
the international community have an obligation to insure that a
distinction is made between refugees, armed elements and
others not deserving of protection under international refugee
instruments.”131  NGOs note that physical separation is the
most effective way to maintain this distinction.  However, as ex-
plained throughout much of this article, it is a very complex
practice to accomplish.  Various NGOs have urged that there is
a need for the elaboration of certain aspects of this process.132
At a meeting of experts on the OAU Convention, it was recog-
nized that no clear legal criteria exists for identifying and sepa-
rating armed elements.133  Clearly, this is an ambiguous area in
the procedures to be utilized in situations such as the Great
130 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Conclusion on the Civilian and Hu-
manitarian Character of Asylum, October 8, 2002, No. 94 (LIII), available at http://
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/Rwmain?docid=3dafdd7c4.
131 Deirdre Clancy, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Protection of Refu-
gees in Mass Influx Situations, Statement on Behalf of NGOs, Global Consulta-
tions on International Protection (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.human
rightsfirst.org/intl_refugees/issues/security/armed_elements.pdf.
132 Id.  The legal basis for lawful ‘separation’ activities: the folder of rights at-
taching to the various categories of separated persons; the procedural safeguards
attaching to a separation exercise; the actors responsible for carrying out and mon-
itoring such activities; and the conditions for termination of separation (tied to the
particular purpose determined for the activity).
133 Id.
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Lakes refugee crisis, and the UNHCR is probably one of the bet-
ter sources of such clarification.
NGOs also urge that camps be located a safe distance from
the border with early intervention at the border and effective
policing of the refugee settlements.  Specifically, NGOs “recom-
mend the formation of a working group of States, UN and ICRC
officials, experts and NGO representatives charged with articu-
lating the legal parameters, and setting out practical guidelines,
for the conduct of separation activities in situations of mass in-
flux.”134  This is exactly the conclusion reached in this article
analyzing the Great Lakes refugee crisis in the context of the
UNHCR’s legal mandate.  It is this lack of articulation in the
guidelines that has led to the failures of the UNHCR in the
Great Lakes region after the Rwanda genocide.  Without collab-
oration of all actors involved and the creation of specific guide-
lines and procedures, the international community’s response to
such situations of mass influx of refugees will continue to fail in
providing the very protection and assistance that is promised to
refugees.
Some have pointed out that effective separation procedures
may require the use of force, which the UNHCR is not author-
ized to use.  However, in response to this proposal, others have
suggested that the “only truly effective way to secure camps is
by means of a force trained in issues of refugee protection and
human rights with the mandate and capability to use armed
force.”135  This is an additional measure that could be taken to
improve the legitimacy and strength of the UNHCR’s role.  Spe-
cially trained forces with the ability to use force when needed
may be of crucial importance in the face of such refugee crises.
While it remains the duty of the host State to provide se-
curity to the refugee population, State action sometimes needs
to be augmented “either through technical and capacity build-
ing cooperation or via direct intervention.”136  NGOs agree that
“the absence of procedures to deal with exclusion in the context
of mass influx situations poses a major operational challenge in
refugee protection.”  Therefore, NGOs suggest that the opera-
tional guidelines be developed “on applying the exclusion
134 Id. (emphasis added).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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clauses in situations of mass influx.”137  Again, there is a severe
need for the expansion of the UNHCR’s legal mandate so that it
has the necessary procedures and guidelines to follow in order
to handle such situations effectively and successfully.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Great Lakes refugee crisis was a disaster
in the eyes of the international community primarily due to the
UNHCR’s failure to implement the exclusion clauses of its legal
mandate and its failure to perform the necessary RSD.  These
failures were partially due to the UNHCR’s lack of preparation
in having the full and necessary understanding of the social and
political situations surrounding the Rwanda genocide.  Addi-
tionally, the mass influx nature of the crisis was something for
which the UNHCR’s mandate does not provide adequate reme-
dies.  Ultimately, the UNHCR’s failure can be boiled down and
attributed to the lack of articulation and specificity of its own
legal mandate.  In order to prevent such a refugee crisis from
occurring again in the future, it is essential that the UNHCR
add more specific guidelines and procedures to its mandate and
provide its staff with the necessary training and preparation to
follow these guidelines and procedures.  Without updating the
UNHCR’s legal mandate, there is no way that the UNHCR can
fulfill its international legal obligation in refugee crises such as
the Great Lakes refugee crisis.
137 Id.
22https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/11
